Labor and Employment Law
In what appears to be a case of first impression the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that an employee could essentially sue her employer for sexual harassment without completing the pre-suit steps required by either Florida or Federal law. Gerber v. Vincent’s Men’s Hairstyling, Inc., Case No. 4D09-5059 (Fla. 4th DCA March 30, 2011)
Jamie Gerber was employed by Vincent’s Men’s Hairstyling as a stylist. She filed a lawsuit against its owner and the company alleging that the owner touched her in a sexual manner on several occasions. Her complaint included counts for negligent retention, battery and vicarious liability. Vincent’s defended by arguing that although the complaint sounded in negligence it was actually a complaint for sexual harassment and because the employee had not completed the pre-suit filing requirements necessary to file a sexual harassment complaint, should be dismissed. Additionally the employer argued that it was immune from suit because of workers compensation immunity.
The mere fact that the plaintiff possessed statutory causes of action did not bar her from asserting parallel common-law causes of action in tort. The appellate court held that “Florida law permits multiple causes of action to co-exist.” Slip opinion at p. 2. Explaining further, the Court explained:
The fact that the complaint alleges a ‘hybrid’ of facts supporting both common law tort violations and statutory sexual harassment violations is not dispositive, as the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint can stand on their own under common law. If, upon completion of the EEOC administrative process, plaintiff chooses to seek amendment of her complaint to add statutory sexual harassment claims, that is her prerogative. Meanwhile, plaintiff is free to file a complaint setting forth claims based on common law torts, as opposed to statutory violations. The trial court thus erred in dismissing her complaint.
Id. at pp. 2-3.
Based on its reading of the Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1998), the Court concluded that Ms. Gerber’s common-law claims were not barred by the doctrine of worker’s compensation immunity because “the plaintiff’s injuries allegedly resulted from a battery, which is not directly related to the work environment or work related activities.” Slip opinion at p. 5.
The court noted conflict with Doe v. Footstar Corporation, 987 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), in which the Second District Court of Appeal, based on its reading of Byrd, “held that the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule barred the plaintiff’s cause action against their child’s employer for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision and for assault, battery, and rape.” Slip opinion at p. 4. It is the view of the Second District, as expressed by Judge Casanueva, in a concurring opinion in Footstar Corporation v, Doe, 932 So. 2d 1272, 1278, that there was no common law cause of action for sexual harassment and that plaintiffs who choose not to plead a statutory cause of action for sexual harassment face a difficult task in overcoming the employer’s worker’s compensation immunity defense.
Accordingly, the Fourth District certified conflict between its decision in Gerber with that of the Second District in Doe to resolve the apparent conflict between the circuits on this important issue. Slip opinion at p. 5.
Prepared by: Brennan Donnelly
Labor & Employment Law Practice Group
bdonnelly@lawfla.com
