Two recent cases have highlighted issues that should be a fundamental for every attorney practicing law.
In Florida Bar v. Mirk, Case No. SC08-1423 (Fla. April 7, 2011), the Court disbarred an attorney for multiple trust account violations with the admonition:
Once again, we emphasize to the members of the Bar that an attorney is never permitted to withdraw or otherwise use client funds held in trust except as specifically authorized under the Bar Rules. To engage in such conduct, a lawyer risks full disciplinary sanctions under the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, including disbarment. As we have stated, disbarment is presumed the appropriate discipline when an attorney misappropriates client money held in trust and [Lawyer] simply has not presented any arguments to rebut the presumption in this case.
Slip opinion at p. 11.
The case is also instructive on the need to have in place a written agreement setting forth the nature of the representation and the arrangements for compensation. The primary dispute concerned the Lawyer’s compensation for work he did for the client. There was no written agreement between the Lawyer and the client. The Lawyer testified that he had an oral agreement that he would be paid a $40,000 flat fee for each company he established and $100,000 per year to act as corporate counsel. The Client testified that there was no flat fee agreement and that the Lawyer agreed to be paid a portion of the future profits in the event that the venture was successful. The referee believed the client. Id. at p. 4.
The Court noted” “When a lawyer fails to place an agreement for representation in writing, he or she is always at risk of becoming involved in a fee dispute with a client.” Id. at p. 10.
In Golden Gate Home, LC v. Levy et al, Case No. 3D10-1209 (Fla. 3d DCA April 13, 2011), the Court, in reversing a summary judgment entered which dismissed with prejudice portions of a legal malpractice complaint, held: “Whether [lawyers] neglected a reasonable duty and proximately caused Golden Gate’s loss (and whether the actions of Golden Gate and successor counsel were an intervening, superseding cause) are, at this stage, questions of fact and not law.” Slip opinion at pp. 12-13.
The underlying facts indicated that in the course of the lawyers’ representation of Golden Gate, and subsequent to the matter being set for trial, the lawyers did not file a witness or exhibit list; nor did Golden Gate respond to interrogatories or a request for production. Despite a subsequent court order compelling Golden Gate to respond to the outstanding discovery requests, Golden Gate did not file any response to the outstanding discovery. A month later the lawyers moved to withdraw from the case. The motion to withdraw was granted and Golden Gate was given 15 days to obtain substitute counsel, who filed a “conditional” notice of appearance, stating that it would undertake the representation only if the court granted a continuance of the scheduled trial date. The trial court denied the motion for continuance. Eventually, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to obtain subsequent counsel, then reinstating it after obtaining counsel, and then reconsidering that order and dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Golden Gate filed a legal malpractice action against the lawyers, alleging that the lawyer's "actions during the [litigation], together with their late withdrawal from the [litigation], left Golden Gate without counsel who could come into the case and properly prepare for a trial that was less than thirty days away. [The lawyers] moved to dismiss, contending that it was not their withdrawal from the case, but rather the independent, superseding actions of Golden Gate and its subsequent counsel that caused whatever losses Golden Gate claims to have suffered." Id. at pp. 8-9.
The Court noted that “the fact the [lawyers] had withdrawn from the case does not necessarily absolve them of potential liability for subsequent events.” Id. at p. 9. Citing to a Fourth District case, Dadic v. Schneider, 722 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the Court stated:
We recognize that the attorney-client relationship here ended before the ultimate conclusion of the underlying lawsuit. However, while employment is an element, an attorney need not be in privity with the client throughout the entire course of the underlying action. Where the attorney-client relationship ends before its conclusion, the question is whether the attorney proximately caused the client’s damages.
Id. at p. 11.
