Florida Supreme Court Invalidates Nursing Home Arbitration Agreement as Against Public Policy
By: Melanie R. Leitman, Associate Attorney
Edward Clark was admitted to OP Winter Haven, a nursing home, by his niece, Gayle Shotts. Ms. Shotts signed all of the relevant paperwork on behalf of her uncle, who had suffered brain damage as a result of a car accident many years prior. One of the documents Ms. Shotts signed on behalf of her uncle contained a clause requiring arbitration in accordance with the American Health Lawyers Association arbitration rules for “any dispute that might arise”[1] during Mr. Clark’s stay at the nursing home. The arbitration agreement also prohibited the arbitrators from awarding punitive damages and provided that the terms of the agreement were severable. Upon Mr. Clark’s death in 2003, Ms. Shotts, as personal representative, filed suit against the nursing home and several other related parties alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duties. The defendants responded to the complaint by moving to compel arbitration and Ms. Shotts objected, arguing that the agreement was void and unenforceable as against public policy. The trial court, concluding that the agreement containing the arbitration clause was “enforceable, not severable and not repugnant to the public policy of the State of Florida[,]”[2] found in favor of the defendants and granted their motion to compel.
Ms. Shotts appealed the trial court’s decision and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to the motion to compel but found error in the trial court’s holding that the agreement was not severable. Additionally, the Second DCA found that the agreement could potentially violate public policy because of its provision prohibiting punitive damages, although because this portion could be severed by the arbitrators, the agreement as a whole was not unenforceable for public policy. Ms. Shotts then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, raising six issues. The court granted her request for discretionary review and addressed three of her claims.
First, Ms. Shotts contended that under relevant law, the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether or not an arbitration agreement violates public policy. A review of federal and state law found that when the enforceability argument goes to the arbitration clause itself, courts are the more appropriate entity to resolve the dispute because it goes to the making of the agreement as opposed to the contract generally. Decisions on public policy concerns regarding arbitration agreements fall under the jurisdiction of the courts because if the arbitration agreement is violative of public policy, then no valid agreement exists and there is nothing for the arbitrator to decide.
Second, Ms. Shotts claimed that it was error for the Second DCA to fail to find that the agreement’s limitation of remedies (excluding punitive damages) violated public policy. A review of Florida cases found that all districts but one have found limitation of remedies clauses in nursing home contracts to be either violative of public policy or unconscionable. More specifically, the Legislature provided for certain remedies in the Nursing Home Resident’s Act and the American Health Lawyers Association rules contain provisions which are inconsistent with and thus undermine these statutory remedies. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court held that “any arbitration agreement that substantially diminishes or circumvents [the statutory] remedies stands in violation of the public policy of the State of Florida and is unenforceable.”[3]
The third of Ms. Shotts’s claims that the Florida Supreme Court addressed involved the severability of the limitation of remedies provision. The district court found that the relevant provision’s potential to violate public policy did not render the entire agreement unenforceable because it was severable. Ms. Shotts disagreed. The Florida Supreme Court first conducted a review of relevant Florida law and found that generally, [w]hether a contract is entire or divisible depends upon the intention of the parties.”[4] More specifically, nearly all of the DCAs have ruled on the issue of public policy implications and severability of limitation of remedies provisions in nursing home contracts, reaching varying results.[5] In examination of the facts of the present case, the Court found that the limitation of remedies clause invoking the American Health Lawyers Association rules to be so inextricably intertwined with the essence of the agreement that it could not be severed without the trial court being forced to re-write the agreement, which is not an appropriate role for the court to take.[6]
Finally the Court addressed the facts of this case in light of the recent United States Supreme Court holding in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the arbitrator must decide whether or not an arbitration agreement is unconscionable. The Florida Supreme Court, however, found Jackson to be distinguishable from the case at hand because the agreement that Ms. Shotts signed, unlike the agreement in Jackson, contained no delegation provision.
Justice Polston dissented from the majority opinion, reasoning that the agreement’s language providing for arbitration of “any dispute” is a delegation provision, thus bringing this case under the scope of the Jackson holding. Consequently, the enforceability of the agreement, he argued, along with other disputes arising under same, should have been determined by the arbitration panel and not by the court.
[1] Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 36 Fla L. Weekly S665, S674 (2011).
[2] Id. at S666 (quoting Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 998 So. 2d 639, 640-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)).
[3] Id. at S671.
[4] Id. at S672 (quoting Local No. 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So. 2d 818, 821-22 (Fla. 1953)).
[5] The First DCA held that such a provision is severable so long as the agreement contains a severability clause. Alterra Health Care Corp. v. Estate of Linton, 953 So. 2d 574, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The Second DCA, in the present case and in other cases, has held that severability exists, even in the presence of a nonseverability clause. See e.g., Manor Health Care Servs. v. Stiehl, 22 So. 3d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The Fourth and Fifth DCAs both have held that regardless of the presence of language addressing severability, limitation of remedies clauses are not severable. Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Fletcher v. Huntington Place Ltd. P’ship, 952 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
[6] The Court relied heavily on the reasoning in Hanson as support for its conclusion on this issue. Id. at S672-73.
